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The EU co-operation crisis 
The refugee movements in the summer of 2015 pose a particular challen-
ge to EU external border control and the refugee reception capacities of 
Member States, particularly those at the EU external border. At the same 
time, EU borders at land and sea in Northern Africa and at the shores of the 
Mediterranean have been under the strain of unregulated crossings and 
refugee migration for more than two decades already. Between the end of 
the 1990s and 2011, more than 150,000 migrants reached the tiny Italian 
island of Lampedusa (Cuttitta, 2012). Greece, Cyprus, Malta and Spain also 
received thousands of refugees and migrants. Yet, many more crossings are 
just not recorded since undocumented border crossing is, by definition, a 
practice hard to detect. 
While many states in the southern and eastern European neighbourhood 
have become insecure in recent years, the European border and asylum 
system revealed one of its key shortcomings, it allows for burden shirking. 
Burden shirking means that some Member States enjoy the opportuni-
ties of cooperation, a borderless single market as well as effective refugee 
protection, but do not share its costs proportionately (Thielemann and El-
Enany, 2010). The EU Dublin regulation (Regulation 604/ 2013) demands 
the country of first entry to deal with the reception and claim for refugee 
status of the asylum seeker. This rule supposedly shifts the burden in bor-
der control and refugee reception to southern European countries. At the 
same time, some Member States in Northwestern Europe such as Germa-
ny, Sweden, and Austria effectively host disproportionately more refugees 
than southern or eastern Member States. Due to their comparatively high 
refugee protection standards, above average recognition rate, and efficient 
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The refugee crisis that unfolded in Europe in the summer of 2015 questions the effectiveness 
of European border and refugee policies. The 
breakdown of the Dublin and Schengen rules 
due to chaotic situations at the borders in the 
Balkans marks a critical juncture for the EU. 
We consider this breakdown as a consequence 
of a long-lasting co-operation crisis among EU 
Member States. The most recent Council decision 
responds to this co-operation crisis (Council 
Decision 12098/15). This Policy Brief analyses 
EU policy and politics and argues that plans for 
refugee relocation and reception centres as well 
as the use of qualified majority voting in the 
Council can unfold a dynamic that helps to solve 
the co-operation crisis. However, underlying the 
problems of co-operation and effectiveness is 
the EU’s border paradox: while EU border policy 
works towards refugee deterrence, EU asylum 
policy aims at refugee protection. The EU’s 
approach in regulating borders and asylum can 
be understood in terms of ‘organised hypocrisy’ 
(Brunsson, 1993). Reconciling the paradox calls 
for overcoming such hypocrisy. 
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administrations they are preferred destinations for refugees. In contrast, 
some Member States in the East and West of the EU hardly host any 
refugees. Burden sharing mechanisms in terms of refugee relocation 
among Member States, true financial burden sharing, or actual shared 
responsibility for controlling the external EU border have not been set 
up accordingly. The European Asylum Support Office with its ‘Asylum 
Assistance Teams’ as well as ‘Rapid Interventions’ led by the European 
Border agency Frontex have not yet been developed towards fully func-
tional supranational executive agencies. EU agencies can assist and 
support, however, they cannot take over responsibilities for border con-
trol and refugee protection. These deficiencies in the functioning of the 
system have allowed for free riding of some Member States and has 
contributed to a co-operation crisis in EU border and asylum politics. 
Political will and infrastructure that could have dealt with the relatively 
high increase in refugee migration has been missing. If anything policy 
on burden sharing would only be voluntary and remain stalled in a pilot 
mode (European Commission 2011, 835). 
The ‘Juncker plan’ and recent initiatives to establish burden 
sharing
The adoption of burden sharing mechanisms as decided upon in the 
Council decision of 22 September 2015 (Council Decision 12098/15) 
might address the problem of burden shirking among EU Member Sta-
tes. Member States in the East and West of the EU will be obliged 
to take part in a relocation system that assigns refugees according to 
GDP, population size, unemployment rate, and number of refugees al-
ready resident in the respective Member State. In total 120,000 re-
fugees will be relocated within the Union, most of them from Greece 
(50,400) and Italy (15,600). In comparison to actual arrivals (more 
than 700.000 unauthorized border crossings were recorded along the 
EU external border between January and August 2015) and planned 
relocations among Member States (120,000) the plan of Commission 
President Jean-Claude Juncker will soon have to be revised. The fact 
that Hungary opposed the plan although it initially meant to benefit 
from the relocation scheme by sending 54,000 refugees to other Mem-
ber States indicates the enormous sensitivity that binding quotas have 
on national sovereignty (Robinson, 2015). In addition to the relocation 
procedure, measures such as the establishment of ‘hot spots’ for refu-
gee reception and assessment of status in ‘frontline’ states as well as 
financial assistance to refugee receiving Member States were agreed 
upon (Council Decision 12098/15). Whether this plan has the scope 
and potential to avoid chaotic situations at European borders and re-
establish free movement in the EU can only be guessed at.  A relocation 
scheme and the establishment of hot spots mean to cede sovereignty 
over the decision of foreigners’ access to the territory to the EU level. 
Even Italy and Greece claiming for EU solidarity on the issue are wary of 
the sovereignty infringing consequences of the Juncker plan (Robinson, 
2015).   Still, the one-off relocation procedure can be an important first 
step towards true and permanent co-operation in a EU asylum system 
that is undermined by burden shirking.
Considering the consequences of true burden sharing for sovereignty, 
not only the Juncker plan itself marks a critical juncture in EU asylum 
and border policy but also the decision making process leading to its 
adoption. It is remarkable that a majority of Member States adopted 
the plan against opposition from four Eastern European Member Sta-
tes. Romania, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia opposed refu-
gee relocation claiming infringement on their sovereignty and wish to 
maintain cultural and religious homogeneity in their respective coun-
tries. By overruling the opposing countries with a qualified majority 
vote (QMV) (55% of MS in the Council, representing 65% of the EU po-
pulation) the Council broke with its long established norm of deciding 
by consensus (Trauner and Ripoll, 2015). Enforcing the treaty rules also 
bears the chance of re-establishing the EU’s capacity to act on the crisis. 
QMV had been an option in Council decision making on refugee issues 
since 2004, still Member States refrained from overruling each other on 
the sovereignty sensitive issue of refugee admission (Zaun, 2015). Thus 
the Home Affairs ministers’ Council meeting on 22 September 2015 
can be considered a critical juncture in EU decision-making on refu-
gee reception. More decisions not based on member state consensus 
can be expected. Although promising more efficient policy making, the 
frequent use of QMV might have the effect of decreasing the policies’ 
overall legitimacy. Decisions taken consensually have the backing of all 
Member States. In sovereignty-sensitive issues the overruled minority 
has more room and opportunity to exploit anti-EU positions and pos-
sibly evade implementation. The deepening of frictions among national 
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governments, explicit dissent with the Council decision, and reluctance 
in implementing the relocation mechanism, can already be observed. 
 
The EU border paradox: Refugee deterrence and reception
Policy measures and a new approach to decision making can address 
some of the regulatory deficiencies in EU border and refugee policies. 
However, the recent crisis also revealed that core political conflicts re-
lated to borders and migration can hardly be resolved by more EU co-
operation. At the core of the EU’s divisive response to the refugee crisis 
do not only lie regulatory construction errors but also the paradoxes of 
bordering itself. In practice, the EU and its Member States’ commitment 
to the international legal framework for refugee protection and their 
actual border control policies are in many ways antagonistic to each 
other. While the Geneva refugee convention promotes a universal right 
to protection and freedom from state persecution to each individual, 
borders delimit the rights of communities to self-determination. Bor-
ders are institutions that legitimize closure and international refugee 
law justifies claims for entry. 
In theory, claims for entry could be assessed at the border without con-
tradicting refugees’ rights for making such claims. However, different 
from nation state borders EU border policy in particular is characterized 
by an in-built antagonism between refugee deterrence on the one hand 
and their reception on the other. This means that some EU border con-
trol instruments have the function of limiting asylum seekers’ ability 
to execute their right for assessment of refugee status (Moreno Lax, 
2008). Since the refugee convention applies territorially the EU’s refu-
gee deterrence efforts were spatially extended way beyond its external 
border. By means of readmission agreements with third countries and 
migrants’ countries of origin, ever more strict requirements for visa, and 
capacity building on third country’s border control capacities, migrants 
and refugees alike were kept away from reaching EU territory. Taken 
together the measures decreased and slowed down movements. They 
functioned in terms of filtering movements with the effect of chan-
nelling them into routes such as the Balkan, the Mediterranean and 
North Africa route. Perpetual pressure on certain borders would lead to 
a permanent emergency situation at certain sections of the external EU 
borders (Guild and Bigo, 2010). 
The 2015 refugee crisis leads to a re-assessment of the EU border pa-
radox. The system of deterring refugees away from EU territory by assi-
stance of countries neighbouring the EU became dysfunctional. Social 
unrest in Turkey and Lebanon as well as civil wars in Libya and Syria 
massively counteract the strategy of externalizing border control. The 
crisis in the Balkans should not only be seen as an effect of a quantita-
tive increase in movements and the concurrent tightening of Hungarian 
– and then Croatian and Slovenian – border controls; but also as the 
outcome of a breakdown of the EU’s external migration control efforts. 
The management of the border by Balkan countries vis-à-vis the in-
crease of the number of refugees crossing Europe’s external borders 
there, brought to light the contradictions of the EU border as it is de-
signed and managed by the EU and its Member States. The response of 
the Hungarian government to the refugees is an example of how the EU 
policy antagonism produces contradictions. The country did not live up 
to its EU obligations for refugee reception and registration. Thousands 
of Syrian refugees claiming a status were refused entry, maltreated and 
tormented with water cannons (Weaver and Siddique, 2015). At the 
same time, the Hungarian government tried to enforce control at the 
EU external border. According to the Schengen Borders code it was not 
allowed to tolerate undocumented crossings. The Hungarian incident 
can be compared to Spanish border policy. The country built a six-me-
ter fence surrounding its exclaves Ceuta and Melilla in North Africa. 
Spain efficiently shifts the burden of refugee reception to neighbou-
ring Morocco. Clearly, there the commitment to international refugee 
protection clashes with an interest in refugee deterrence. In contrast 
to Spain or Hungary, the governments of Germany and Sweden open-
ly question the Dublin system and urge for burden sharing and better 
refugee reception in all Member States. The antagonistic goals of EU 
border control and refugee protection become more and more obvious: 
select access and limitation of migration and refugee movements, on 
the one hand, and refugee protection and reception on the other. This 
leads to divisiveness and organised hypocrisy in the EU’s response to 
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the refugee crisis.
Reconciling the border paradox? 
Theoretically, effective refugee protection can be combined with a bor-
der policy that aims at control of cross-border movements. The condi-
tion for both policies not to run into conflict with each other neces-
sitated a border that does not aim to deter refugees from entering EU 
territory. However, elements in EU border policy pursue this aim. The 
EU border needed to be reduced to its function in controlling access 
and assessing claims for status. This would mean that the border would 
be transformed to function not only as a place of crossing but also as 
a place of temporary stay for assessment of migrants’ and refugees’ 
status. After the assessment of status, relocation within the EU would 
be an option to reduce tensions in countries situated at the border. The 
Council’s adoption of hot spots for refugee reception in Italy and Greece 
corresponds to this logic. 
However, as long as refugee deterrence policies are implemented the 
border paradox can hardly be reconciled. Mechanisms such as strict re-
quirements for visa and an enhancement of border control capacities in 
third countries will compromise or even inhibit asylum seekers’ claims 
to protection. The combination of two strategies can be proposed as a 
viable alternative that corresponds to the liberal norms the EU claims 
to adhere to. Humanitarian corridors or visa for refugees’ safe arrival 
in Europe could be established, and in addition or as an alternative 
protection efforts in safe havens close to conflict areas could be step-
ped up. Prioritization of one or the other instrument could correspond 
to Member States’ reception capacity and political opportunity.  Such 
arrangements would not necessarily create a pull factor: as the world 
distribution of refugee populations demonstrates, those escaping from 
a warzone tend to remain close to their countries – relatives and fami-
lies. Thus, refugee protection would be secured and (ideally) deterrence 
was less of a necessity. 
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